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Abstract: 
This work shows that defective behaviors from the cooperative equilibrium in the management of 
common resources can be fueled and triggered by the presence of agents with myopic behaviors. The 
behavior implemented by naïve agents, even if done with cooperative intent, can activate a dynamic of 
cascading defections from the cooperative strategy within the harvesters’ group.  
This paper demonstrates and discusses that the apparent and detectable decay of the cooperative choices 
in the dilemmas of common resources are not an exclusive and indisputable signal of an escalation in 
free-riding intentions, but can also be an outcome of the present-biased preferences and myopic behaviors 
of the cooperative agents. In fact, within the context populated by conditional cooperators with a 
heterogeneous myopic discount factor, in the absence of information about agents’ intentions, the present-
biased preferences can trigger a strategy that directs the community to excessively increase its harvesting 
level, even in presence of the other-regarding motives. Therefore, a lowering of the cooperative behaviors 
can also be the effect of the absence of coordination instruments in response to the cognitive bias that 
influences human behaviors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the task of managing common resources, one of the main issues that a community 
faces is avoiding the trigger of the tragedy of the commons. A non-collapsing 
management of the commons largely depends upon the cooperative capabilities of 
communities and their ability to maintain the cooperation inside groups over time. This 
study will show when and in what manner there is involvement of present-biased 
preferences in the triggering of strategies that contribute to non-cooperative behaviors in 
common harvesting. 
Cooperative behaviors have been largely investigated in behavioral economics (Ernst 
Fehr and Gächter 2000; Gächter 2007; Sally 1995), and other-regarding and social 
preferences are found in everyday life (Gintis 2000) and in a wide range of situations 
and cultures (Alpizar et al. 2008; Frey and Meier 2004; Meier and Stutzer 2008; 
Henrich et al. 2005). Nevertheless, in presence of social preferences, when individuals 
participate in common pool resources or public good games, in absence of coordination 
and enforcement instruments or institutions, there is frequently a decay of cooperative 
behaviors (Andreoni 1988; Dawes and Thaler 1988; E. Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Gintis 
2000; Gintis et al. 2003; Isaac et al. 1994; Ledyard 1994). When individuals cooperate 
only when others also cooperate (conditional cooperators), the presence of free-riders, 
or individuals without full cooperative behaviors, can trigger a dynamic of defection by 
cooperation (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010).  
When resource management includes specific intertemporal peculiarities with relevant 
externalities, resource harvesting is vulnerable to the risks of inefficient intertemporal 
management. This is evident observing the difficulties that people often encounter in 
defining intertemporal choices and allocating consumption in a consistent manner. This 
phenomenon refers to the existence of present-biased preferences. In fact, individuals, 
due to their impulsivity, follow short-term benefits without considering adequately the 
long-term consequences, particularly in situations in which the individuals 
systematically behave by discounting the near future more than the distant one (G. 
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Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). These behaviors reveal the lack of self-control in the 
face of the pressure of the present (D. Laibson 1997; T. O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). 
This happens when due to present-biased preferences, the immediate benefit directs the 
choices despite the long-run interest. This is true also in the case of social dilemmas. In 
Herr et al. (1997), for example, participants interact in a common pool resource 
experiment that reveals lower efficiency when the experimental design provides 
intertemporal externalities, showing substantially short-sighted behaviors. Participants, 
in fact, do not adequately consider the future consequences of their decisions, and they 
show short-sighted behaviors in dynamic games (Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin 2013).    
Myopic behavioral patterns are particularly dangerous in the context of common 
resources because they can generate rapid resource depletions. Generally, common 
resource dilemmas are defined within a context in which the long run choices and short 
ones can conflict, thus exposing the resources to the risks derived from present-bias. 
Thus, the role played by present-bias in the decay dynamics of cooperation in the 
commons could be consistent with the systematic decline of the cooperative propensity 
with the passage of time. In fact, one of the salient elements that is present in the 
common resource experiment is the progressive decay of the cooperative behaviors with 
the advancement of the interactions (Ostrom 2000).  
When resources are commons with intertemporal harvesting peculiarities, the decay of 
cooperation intentions can be the main obstacle to the preservation of a given stock of 
resources. Hence it is clear the reason why the decay of cooperation in the commons has 
so much relevance. However, in this context, the role played by the cognitive biases is 
not adequately investigated: if and in what manner present-bias can affect the dynamics 
of the cooperation inside the group have yet to be raised. It is also remarkable that even 
though it is beyond any doubt the existence of cooperation capability as part of the 
human evolutionary success (Gintis 2009), it is unclear why societies sometimes fail to 
achieve the level of fairness and cooperation that they desire. Therefore, this work 
presents a representation of human behaviors that do not exclude these cognitive 
foundations of the process of decision-making in the intertemporal context. Without the 
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necessary inclusion of the intertemporal cognitive features of human behavior, the 
models used to describe the human phenomena in resource harvesting are unable to 
include some of the real issues that can trigger the defective strategies from cooperation 
in the management of the common resources generating the overexploitation. 
 
2. Present bias and why take care of it in the commons 
 
Present-bias refers to behaviors that derive from the duality of the discount rate in short-
term and long-term periods that determines a non-consistent time behavior in tasks that 
require intertemporal planning. Time inconsistency implies that an optimal choice 
defined in the present could be revisited in the future (Strotz 1955). The present bias 
thus determines the emergence of preference reversals that generate a conflict between 
long run preferences and immediate choices, resulting in a conflict between the early 
intention of the agent and the choice made at the moment. The genesis of these 
phenomena has a solid cognitive foundation. In fact, it is noteworthy that researchers in 
the field of cognitive neuroscience support a non-constant discount rate finding two 
ways to process the discounting: one for the immediate rewards and another for the 
delayed ones. 1  Experiments reveal the activation of the limbic circuit just prior to 
choices that provide an immediate reward (Samuel M McClure et al. 2004). Similar 
conclusions were also drawn by Hariri et al. (2006), and McClure et al. (2007).2 The 
 
1 Two distinct brain areas are involved in the definition of intertemporal choices. The first area, the limbic 
and paralimbic, is a brain region heavily innervated by the dopaminergic system and connected to 
rewards expectation (Breiter and Rosen 1999; Knutson et al. 2001; Samuel M. McClure et al. 2003), 
while the other area belongs to the front-parietal region, an area that supports the higher cognitive 
functions (G. F. Loewenstein et al. 2008). 
2 The limbic circuit is the seat of the emotional reaction processes (A R Hariri et al. 2000) and impulsive 
behaviors (Pattij and Vanderschuren 2008); in fact the limbic system - the most ancient part of a human’s 
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joint involvement of two systems in decision-making processes is further supported by 
Bechara (2005), Bechara et al. (1999), Damasio (1994) and LeDoux (1996). Therefore, 
for choices defined in an intertemporal context, the dualism between the limbic system 
and the deliberative-cognitive system of the neocortex highlights a distinction between 
the reactions in responses to short and long-term stimuli. Information related to 
immediate rewards are mostly subjected to be processed by the impulsive system, 
instead a more appropriate reflective system refers to decisions regarding long run 
rewards. It is possible to assert that the present bias is an element of decision-making 
processes deeply rooted in human nature, in several areas of the individual’s life. In fact, 
the present biased behaviors are also clearly evident in several situations (Della Vigna 
2009; Frederick et al. 2002; Thaler 1981) and different contexts, such as the low saving 
rate (Ashraf et al. 2006; Harris and Laibson 2001; D. Laibson 1997; D. I. Laibson et al. 
1998), health choices (van der Pol and Cairns 2002), drugs, smoking or buying 
addictions (Frederick et al. 2002; Gruber and Koszegi 2001; Thaler and Shefrin 1981; 
Wertenbroch 1998), as well as procrastination behaviors (Benabou and Tirole 2003; T. 
O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). The unifying factor in all these fields is the contrasting 
dichotomy between long-term well-being and immediate enjoyment. This dichotomy 
characterizes the emergence of present biased behaviors. Present-bias seems, therefore, 
to be a specific peculiarity of decision heuristics on intertemporal choices in 
frameworks where long-term plans can be subject to revision and where the long-term 
outcomes depend upon a continuum of instantaneous or short-term choices. These 
peculiarities also define the framework of common resource dilemmas. In fact, the 
intertemporal management of the commons has the characteristics of the framework in 
 
brain – also includes the amygdala (Isaacson 1974), whose functions are closely related to emotional 
activities (Cardinal et al. 2002; Ahmad R. Hariri et al. 2002). Vice versa, a second area that it is afferent to 
the neocortex, the most recently formed brain area from an evolutionary perspective, shows prevalent 
activation in correspondence of actions that are the outcome of choices that take future gains into 
consideration best. This second area, exclusive to mammals and distinctly developed in humans (Rachlin 
1989), plays a key role in appropriate deliberative-cognitive activities. 
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which the long-term and short-term choices can conflict, exposing consequently the 
resources to the risks that can derive from behaviors strongly oriented to the present. In 
the fields of the resources exploitation the present-bias and naïve behaviors could prove 
very dangerous for the sustainability of the resources, in fact in absence of time 
consistency an undesired collapse of the natural resources could occur (Hepburn et al. 
2010). Hence, when a conflict arises between the short and long-term interests, as in the 
management of common resources, present-biased preferences are likely to play an 
important role.3 
It is well known that the commons is a field in which the relevant elements of human 
choosing are not limited to the area of intertemporal resources management, but it is 
also a field in which human sociality plays a diriment role. On one hand, the adoption of 
sustainable and cooperative behaviors in relevant social dilemmas depends on the 
degree of consciousness about the effect of their own behaviors on others, and on the 
common resources; this inclination finds form in cooperative and other-regarding 
motives. On the other hand, the choices made reflect the capability of correctly reading 
and weighing costs and benefits that result from one’s own choices. The intertemporal 
decision-making process that involve present biased preferences directing these choices 
are also the paths by which individuals solve social dilemmas. Within this process, 
cooperation also finds realization. For these reasons, cooperative behaviors and 
intertemporal dynamics need to be analyzed together.  
The contributions to understanding the role of other-regarding preferences in social 
dilemmas are abundant in the literature and reveal that the cooperation and fairness 
principle contributes in the formulation of the agents choices  (Ernst Fehr and Gächter 
 
3  In the Field of renewable resources management has been ready showed that present biased-
preferences can reduce the agent’ welfare (Persichina, 2019 b) and that in the context of intergenerational 
transfer of resources the present bias can generate intergenerational inequality even in presence of other-
regarding preferences (Persichina, 2019 a). 
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2000; Gächter 2007; Ostrom et al. 1994). Several works have investigated the true 
foundations of economics when people make decisions within a social context, showing 
with undisputed clarity that the individual’s decisions are mediated by other-regarding 
motives and by prosocial concepts like fairness, cooperation and reciprocity (Andreoni 
1990; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; G. Charness and Rabin 2002; Falk and Fischbacher 
2006; E. Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Rabin 1993). Furthermore, the consequences of the 
introduction of the other-regarding preferences in the theoretical framework on the 
management of the commons draw great attention and offer additional elements of 
analysis for applications in environmental and resources issues (Brekke and Johansson-
Stenman 2008; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman 2012; Gowdy 2008; Gsottbauer and 
van den Bergh 2011; S. Frey and Stutzer 2006). Additionally, in the field of the 
commons, several studies have confirmed the ability of human beings to voluntarily 
sustain the cooperation in resources dilemmas (Casari and Plott 2003; Gary Charness 
and Villeval 2009; Chaudhuri 2011; Ernst Fehr and Leibbrandt 2011; Ledyard 1994; 
Ostrom et al. 1992).  
However, it is not possible merely to emphasize the presence of the cooperative will of 
individuals: there is also the necessity to truly comment on the frequent observations, 
especially in controlled experiments, of a systematic decay of cooperative behaviors 
over time in repeated interactions (Ostrom 2000). The reasons for the decay of the 
cooperation propensity over time is an argument of great relevance, not merely 
theoretically, but also from the applied perspective: it is known that when confronted 
with resources, which are intrinsically commons and having an intertemporal harvesting 
peculiarity, the decay of the cooperation instances can become the main obstacle to the 
preservation of a given stock of common resources over time and generations. However, 
in this context, the role of cognitive biases has not been adequately explored yet. If and 
in which manner phenomena such as present-bias can affect the dynamics of 
cooperation and its decay continues need still to be defined. But, as it has been 
discussed here, the dynamics of harvesting in the commons has a double determination 
that involves both the cognitive and social spheres, two spheres that are defined as one 
in intertemporal decision-making processes and the other in cooperative attitudes. So 
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the role played by present-biased preferences in the decay of cooperation must be 
clarified, showing that shortsighted behaviors deriving from present-bias can be 
involved in a decay of cooperative interactions over time and within a framework that 
includes common resources, even when agents have preferences for cooperation. 
Therefore, in the following sections it will be shown the manner in which the present-
bias is involved in the triggering of strategies that contribute to a non-cooperative 
behavior in common harvesting, determining cascading defections. 
 
3. Harvesting model and baseline emerged behaviors  
 
The model concerns the activity of harvesting from a stock of non-perishable resources, 
a discrete time framework is considered. The stock of resources at time t is 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡), with 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇]  and T ≠  ∞ . The harvested amount at time t is expressed as ℎ(𝑡𝑡) . The 
fundamental equation of the dynamics of the growth of the resources is as follows: 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑔𝑔,𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)�𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡𝑡),  (1) 
where the growth rate, 𝑓𝑓�𝑔𝑔,𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)�, is not negative.4 In the case in which the stock size 
does not affect the growth rate, the resource stock grows at a constant and strictly 
positive exponential rate equal to 𝑔𝑔, such that: 𝑓𝑓�𝑔𝑔,𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)� ≥ 0 and 𝑔𝑔 > 0 ,    (2) 
and 
if 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑔𝑔,𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡))𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 0 → 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = (𝑔𝑔 − ℎ�) 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) with  ℎ� = ℎ(𝑡𝑡)𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) .  (3) 
The time interval from 0 to T is the finite lifetime of a single agent. Moreover, the initial 
stock of resources and the growth rate are known by all the agents. 
 
4 The non-negative growth rate derives from the non-perishability of the resources.   
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The initial stock at time zero is strictly positive. It is assumed that resources are 
material; therefore, a negative stock is not possible: 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0  with  𝑅𝑅(0) = 𝑅𝑅0 ∧  𝑅𝑅0 > 0    ∀  𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇]. (4) 
The amount harvested at time t by the agent, ℎ(𝑡𝑡), is not restorable, therefore: ℎ(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇].  (5) 
The agent faces a capacity constraint: in each period she cannot harvest more than ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , a value that is strictly positive and finite, and thus, together with the non-
negativity constraint: 
0 ≤ ℎ(𝑡𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚     ∀  𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇]    with   ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 > 0 and ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≠ ∞.   (6) 
Furthermore, each agent also faces a resources constraint such that she cannot harvest at 
time t more than the stock of resources available in that moment: ℎ(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)    ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇].  (7) 
Both the capacity and resources constraints are assumed exogenous and equal for all the 
agents. 
The model assumes only material resources and no exchange market; hence, the welfare 
of the agents depends only on the amount of resources harvested and enjoyed at each 
time, so the lifetime utility of the agent evaluated at time 0 is: 
𝑈𝑈 = �𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡) 𝑢𝑢(ℎ(𝑡𝑡))𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 .  (8) 
Monotonicity and strictly concavity of the utility function is assumed:5 
 
5 This guarantees the existence of a unique optimal solution.  
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𝑢𝑢′(ℎ𝑡𝑡) > 0     𝑢𝑢′′(ℎ𝑡𝑡) < 0    ∀ ℎ𝑡𝑡 ∈ ℛ+.     (9) 
The discount factor 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡) represents the degree of impatience on harvesting. Agents 
exhibit impatience on the harvesting time, such that 𝛿𝛿′ < 0,6 so the discount factor is 
monotonic and decreasing over time with: 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡) > 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡 + 1)  ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇]. (10) 
The problem of the optimal harvesting path can be summarized as the maximization of 
the agent’s utility function (8) under the constraints expressed in (4), (6) and (7) when 
the initial condition and the natural growth rate respect the non-negative constraints and 
the dynamic of resources growth is defined by (1).  
So, assuming continuity for the harvesting amount on the interval [0,ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚], given the 
discount factors 𝐷𝐷 = {δ(0), … , δ(t),…, δ(T)} that respect the peculiarity just enounced,  
at any time 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇] there is just one optimal solution for the problem of maximization 
that the agent has to face.  
 
Of course, the intertemporal harvesting plan depends upon the form of the discount 
factor, in particular if it is expressed in an exponential way that guarantees time 
consistency, or if the agent has some other form of discount that generates time 
inconsistency like in the case of present-biased preferences.  
Hence two possible and alternative outcomes from the process of optimization are 
considered. The first is the no-bias optimal harvesting strategy expressed as: 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇)}.  (11) 
The no-bias optimal harvesting strategy, 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡, is the strategy defined when the discount 
 
6 With this assumption, the case of pleasure in procrastination, δ′(t) > 0, is excluded. 
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factor of the agent is expressed in an exponential manner that guarantees time 
consistency. 7 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡  also corresponds to the long-run optimal harvesting plan for the 
agent (Ted O’Donoghue and Rabin 2002). It is clear that in presence of time consistency 
the agent does not vary his optimal strategy with the passage of time.   
The second possible outcome of the process of optimization, the biased harvesting 
strategy, defined as 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏 , takes place when time inconsistency is assumed. Time 
inconsistency implies that the discount factor of the agent is not constant over time, so it 
is assumed that: 
⎩⎨
⎧ 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 > 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏+1       with   𝑡𝑡 < 𝑠𝑠   and   𝑠𝑠 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇]  for 𝑡𝑡 = 0,𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 ≥ 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏+1       with   𝑡𝑡 < 𝑠𝑠   and   𝑡𝑡, 𝑠𝑠 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇]  for 𝑡𝑡 > 0. (12) 
The consequences of a no constant discount factor can be defined here. 
 
Postulate 1: If it is solved at time t, t < s, with 
𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1 = 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+2, the problem of intertemporal 
optimization in the interval [𝑠𝑠,𝑇𝑇], with an existent unique optimal solution: 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = {𝐸𝐸[ℎ(𝑠𝑠)]𝑡𝑡, . . . ,𝐸𝐸[ℎ(𝑠𝑠 + 1)]𝑡𝑡, . . . ,𝐸𝐸[ℎ(𝑇𝑇)]𝑡𝑡} , where 𝐸𝐸[ℎ(𝑠𝑠)]𝑡𝑡  is the expected 
harvesting amount for time s; and at time s, the same optimization problem is solved in 
the interval [𝑠𝑠,𝑇𝑇] with the following optimal solution: 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 = {ℎ(𝑠𝑠), . . . ,𝐸𝐸[ℎ(𝑠𝑠 + 1)]𝑏𝑏, . . . ,𝐸𝐸[ℎ(𝑇𝑇)]𝑏𝑏} ; when 𝐸𝐸[ℎ(𝑠𝑠)]𝑡𝑡 < 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠)  and 𝐸𝐸[ℎ(𝑠𝑠)]𝑡𝑡 <ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and time s  𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1 > 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+2  with 𝜕𝜕𝛿𝛿𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 < 0, then ℎ(𝑠𝑠) > 𝐸𝐸[ℎ(𝑠𝑠)]𝑡𝑡. 
 
 
7 Agent has no biased preferences when 
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 = 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+𝑛𝑛  ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇] and ∀ 𝑠𝑠 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇] . Only when the 
discounting respects this condition, the agent’s evaluation of the optimal strategy in every period s 
between 0 and T conducts to the same optimal harvesting strategy evaluated in any period t in [0, T]. 
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So, as anticipated, the agent can be present-biased and, in this case, the biased 
harvesting strategy can be expressed as: 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏 = {ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑇𝑇)}. (13) 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏  derives from the instantaneous maximization at each time of the utility of the 
agent as well the 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡, but, in contrary to the case of no-bias optimal harvesting strategy 
the discount factor incorporates the present-bias peculiarities expressed in (12) under 
the constraints expressed earlier. 8  The consequences can be synthetized in the 
following: 
 
Lemma 1: Given an expected harvesting amount formulated at time t, ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) >  0, 
with t < s, t and s in [0,T] and ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) <  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, under the assumption of present bias 
defined in (12), if 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠) >  ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) and 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠)]𝑡𝑡, where 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠) is the resources 
stock at time s and 𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠)]𝑡𝑡 is the expected stock estimated at time t, then at time s the 
agent harvests an amount greater than the amount predicted for the same period in the 
optimal strategy formulated at time t, ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠), that could be harvested in absence of 
bias, such that:  ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑠𝑠) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠)  with ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) ∈ 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡  and ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑠𝑠) ∈ 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏 . (14) 
 
In fact, when 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠)]𝑡𝑡, in the interval [s, T], at time t in the no-bias condition 
the agent will face the same situation faced at time s, but under the bias condition. So it 
will be that 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏  at time t, where 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 is the optimal harvesting plan evaluated at 
time t and 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 is any other harvesting plan different from 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 in the set of all possible 
plans, and 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡  is defined under the hypothesis of an exponential discount such that  
 
8 It is notable that both the hyperbolic that quasi-hyperbolic discounts respond to the property defined. 
Cascading Defections from Cooperation Triggered by Present-Biased Behaviors in the Commons 
13 
 
𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1 = 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+2  with 𝜕𝜕𝛿𝛿𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 < 0 and, ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) ∈ 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡. But at time s with 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1 > 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+2 and 𝜕𝜕𝛿𝛿𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 < 0,  𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏 ≻ 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡, hence at time s the situation expressed in the postulate 1 takes place, so 
because ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∧  ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) < 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠) it will be:  ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑠𝑠) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠). 
 
It is so possible to assert that given a context in which it is effectively possible to assist 
in a reduction of the stock of resources, the existence of present-biased preferences 
could move out the harvesting path. This context is characterized by a situation in which 
it is not possible for the agents to avoid a total exploitation of the resources before the 
end of the periods if they harvest continuously the amount hmax in the interval [0,T]. It is 
obvious that this is the context in which the agent is called to determine a harvesting 
plan in which there is the following condition:  𝑅𝑅0 + ��[𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡𝑡)] ⋅ 𝑓𝑓�𝑔𝑔,𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)��𝑇𝑇−1𝑡𝑡=0  −  ���ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ⋅  �1 + 𝑓𝑓�𝑔𝑔,𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)��𝑡𝑡 �𝑇𝑇−1𝑡𝑡=0𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 ≤ 0, (15) 
where N is the number of agents that harvest from the stock.  
The (15) implies that there is at least one period in which ℎ(𝑡𝑡) < hmax. Then considering 
that the agent has the tendency to distribute his consumption over the time, we assume 
that the agent’s intertemporal preferences are given such that: 
𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 = �ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(0), … ,ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), … ,ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) … ,ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇) �0 < ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚∧
0 < ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �. (16)  
This implies that if ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈  [0, 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 − 1], then ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) < 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) must be 
true in order to have 0 < ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑠𝑠) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. So, considering the implications of (15) and 
(16) and the lemma 1, it is possible to assert the following: 
 
Lemma 2: Given the condition (15) and (16), and given two possible strategies that can 
be derived by the decision making process of the agent, the first one,  
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𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), . . . ,ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇)}, in which, at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 = 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+2 , and the 
second one, 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏 = {ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(0), . . . ,ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), . . . ,ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑇𝑇)} , in which, at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ,  𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 > 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+2, then in the time interval [0,T], there exists at least one period, 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, such that ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏). 
 
In fact, R0 is unique and invariable with respect to the strategy implemented. The (15) 
implies that there exists at least one period where ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  and at least one 
period where ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. Given the existence of a first period in which ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡) is 
lower than ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 , if ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) = ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , clearly ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) >ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏). Additionally, in the case in which ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  and ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 
because in this first period, it is clear that 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) has the same value in both strategies, 
and because 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) must be greater than ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) as consequence of (16), taking care of 
the lemma 1, the present bias as expressed in  (12) determines that ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) >ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏). 
 
The lemmas just enounced have deep consequences in relation to the outcome of the 
cooperative behavior implemented by an agent inside a group of harvesters managing a 
common stock of resources. In fact, the same relationship expressed in these 
propositions also exists when an agent inside a group has cooperative behavior. 
In fact, two possible outcomes of the process of maximization also exist in the case of 
cooperative intentions of the agent: one in the case of exponential discount rate and the 
other derived by present-biased preferences. Both the outcomes correspond to a 
cooperative strategy, but in the first case it is a no-bias cooperative strategy (from now 
named “optimal strategy”), and in the second case it is a biased cooperative strategy 
(from now named “biased strategy”).  
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The context in which the agents cooperate in the management of the commons are so 
defined: the number of the harvester, N, is common knowledge and homogeneity is 
assumed between the N agents in the instantaneous harvesting utilities 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛(ℎ𝑡𝑡) with   
0 ≤ ℎ𝑡𝑡 ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,∀ 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁.9 Recall that the agent does not exercise a deliberative choice 
of one or the other strategies, but can choose between cooperating and being a free-rider 
(or stop cooperating). It is not possible for a biased agent to implement the optimal 
strategy; this is a consequence of the naïve nature of a biased agent who is not 
conscious about the implementation of a biased strategy.10  
Therefore, for the single cooperative agent, when she choices to cooperate, the optimal 
solution is given by the maximization of the sum of the utility of the N agents:11 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖  �𝑈𝑈𝑏𝑏𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏=1    where    𝑈𝑈𝑏𝑏 = �𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡) 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 , (17) 
under the constraints and conditions that we have expressed earlier. 
Under the hypothesis of absence of present-bias,12 the cooperative harvesting plan is the 
optimal cooperative strategy: 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 = {ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (𝑇𝑇)}. (18) 
It easy to understand that a lower amount left unharvested, with respect to the prediction 
of the optimal cooperative strategy, is also the observable effect of a potential act of 
 
9 In the following, heterogeneity will be assumed in the bias factor. 
10 It is recalled that in this model it is assumed naïveté for the biased agents, such that naïve agents are 
fully unaware of their intertemporal inconsistency and of their future re-evaluation of the harvesting 
amounts. 
11 It is assumed there is homogeneity in the utility function, and consequently the cooperative agent 
maximizes the sum of the utilities. 
12The hypothesis is satisfied when 
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 = 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+𝑛𝑛  ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇]  ∧  ∀ 𝑠𝑠 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇]. 
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free-riding. In particular, free-riding behavior at a given time t could emerge when the 
agent harvests an amount greater than the optimal cooperative one: ℎ𝜕𝜕(𝑡𝑡) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡).  (19) 
Proceeding with the no biased behavior, a biased cooperative agent maximizes the total 
amount harvested by the group of N agents as expressed in (17) when his utility 
function is: 
𝑈𝑈𝑏𝑏 = �𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡) 𝑢𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡))𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 ,  (20) 
where 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏 has the properties expressed in (12). In this case the agent adopts the biased 
cooperative strategy:  𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 = {ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 (𝑇𝑇)}. (21) 
Now, considering the results described in lemmas 1 and 2, given that (15) and (16) hold, 
it is possible assert the following: 
 
Proposition 1: Given two possible outcomes of the optimal solution in presence of 
cooperative intentions of the agent, the optimal no-biased strategy:  𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 = {ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (𝑇𝑇)}, in which 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1  ∀ 𝑡𝑡 , and the biased 
strategy 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 = {ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 (0), . . . ,ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), . . . ,ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 (𝑇𝑇)}, in which:  𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 > 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1   for 𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 ≥ 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1   for 𝑡𝑡 > 0, with 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑡𝑡, 𝑠𝑠 ∈ [0,𝑇𝑇].  
Then in the interval (0, T] it exists at least one period, denoted with 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, such that: ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏). (22) 
 
So, if several reasons could lead the agents to defect by a perfect cooperative strategy, 
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also a pure cooperative agent can implement a strategy that does not coincide with Hcopt 
even when his aim is ‘cooperate’ because his choices can be affected by limited 
capabilities in using a constant discount rate, as in the case of present-bias. In what 
follows, the manner in which the effect of the present-bias, also in the presence of 
cooperative intentions, can trigger dynamics of defections is exposed. 
 
4. Cooperation failure due to the present-bias  
 
In a situation in which (22) holds, if the agents cannot be sure about the biased nature of 
the choices of others, it is not possible for a member of the group to distinguish if 
another member of the group harvests an amount greater than the optimal cooperative 
because she has free-riding intentions or because it is a cooperative biased action. 
Therefore, an excessive harvesting of some present-biased agent can be erroneously 
interpreted as an act of free-riding, and in a tit-for-tat strategy can trigger a round of 
defections.   
In order to demonstrate this assertion, a situation in which there are only two harvesters 
is considered. They are conditional cooperators that play a tit-for-tat strategy, harvesting 
simultaneously from the same stock of resources. It is possible to assign to one agent 
the capability to suppose that the other agent can be biased, but she has no information 
about cooperative intentions of the other or about the biased discount factor, so the 
agent lacks any ability to distinguish the biased agents from the free-riders.13 The agents 
are homogeneous in the instantaneous harvesting utilities, 𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏(ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗(ℎ𝑡𝑡) , but 
heterogeneity is assumed in the myopic discount factor 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡)  as defined in (12), hence, 
denoting i and j as the agents, where the agent i has stronger present biased preferences, 
then: 
 
13 Here the existence of the possibility that one of the two agents can be not biased is assumed. 
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𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡)𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡+1) 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏(𝑏𝑏)𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏(𝑏𝑏+1)�   >   
𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡)𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡+1) 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏(𝑏𝑏)𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏(𝑏𝑏+1)�       with  𝑠𝑠 > 𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡 = 0, (23) 
where the hypothetical case of no bias is  
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡)𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡+1) = 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡)𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡+1). Now, considering (23), 
because the instantaneous harvesting utilities are 𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏(ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗(ℎ𝑡𝑡), with 0 ≤ ℎ𝑡𝑡 < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, 
that (15) guarantees the existence of a period 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏  such that ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , and 
considering the results exposed in proposition 1, then: ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏),  (24) 
where ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) and ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) are the amounts effectively harvested by the agents given the 
management strategies when behaviors are biased, at least for the agent i, and coincide 
with the cooperative amounts ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) and ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) as expressed in (21), then: ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) ≤ ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) < ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏). (25) 
Because the agent j does not have instruments to distinguish if the higher harvesting of 
the other agent responds to a cooperative biased strategy or to free-riding intentions as 
expressed in (19), the agent can be induced to opt for a trigger strategy in the presence 
of ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) , even if ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)  responds to the cooperative strategy in which ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) = ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) . If the agent j interprets ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)  as a free-rider attempt, the trigger 
strategy of agent j may involve an increase in the next harvesting amount until the Nash 
dominant non-cooperative amount, such that: ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 1) = ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , while agent i still 
harvests his own cooperative amount. So, if  ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 1) < ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  , at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 1 is: ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 1) < ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 1) with ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 1) = ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚.  (26) 
The increase in the harvesting level of agent j cannot be interpreted by agent i as an 
answer to his biased behavior because – as this model assumes – naïve agents are not 
conscious of their bias and are unable to recognize the appearance of their behavior as 
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potential free-rider behavior. In fact, naïve agents have incomplete self-knowledge 
regarding the biased nature of their own behaviors.  
Hence, observing an amount harvested by agent j greater than the cooperative amount, 
agent i can interpret the harvesting amount of the j agent as a free-riding behavior 
attempt. Because from the viewpoint of agent i because she himself has cooperated until 
time 𝑡𝑡 + 1; consequently, she also can choose to start a trigger strategy harvesting at 
time 𝑡𝑡 + 2 an amount equal to ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. At this time a non-cooperant Nash equilibrium is 
reached in which: ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡 + 2) = ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡 + 2) = ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. (27) 
Similar dynamics can also be triggered with a large number of harvesters. So, the 
question that is raised next is how the implication of present-bias in these defective 
behaviors from the cooperative equilibrium can explicate a dynamic of cascading 
defections.  
 
5. A restrictive case of cascading defections 
 
Because the issue is how the present-bias leads towards defective strategies in the 
absence of which such strategies will not occur, it is not necessary to analyze the 
behavior of the agents that deliberately choice to be free-riders from the beginning. In 
this case, any effect of present-bias is not relevant to adopting defective strategies for 
the obvious reason that in presence of free-rider intentions, the defective strategies from 
the cooperative equilibrium are a consequence of free-riding itself a priori with respect 
to the intertemporal bias. Hence, to show the effect of the present bias in the trigger a 
defective strategy it is considered the case in which all the N agents are cooperative.  
The agents simultaneously harvest from the same stock of resources for T periods, the 
features regarding the stock of resources, growth rate, constraints and utility function 
are those ready presented in the model. Agents follow a tit-for-tat strategy, implying that 
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they choose the cooperative strategy in the first round, but their cooperative intentions 
are not common knowledge. Agents are heterogeneous in their bias discount factors, 
and each agent makes his choice of harvesting for a given period after having observed 
the amount harvested by the other agents in the period before, which is the only 
information about others made available.  
In every period t each agent do a cardinal order of all the amounts harvested, such that it 
is identifies with ℎ1(𝑡𝑡), the amount harvested by the agent that harvests less, and in an 
increasing order Ah until ℎ𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡), where agent N is that one who harvests more: 𝐴𝐴ℎ = {ℎ1(𝑡𝑡), . . . ,ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡), . . . ,ℎ𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡)}, (28) 
where each n agent can distinguish the n-1 agents that have harvested less than her from 
the N-n agents that have harvested more. 
At every round each agent decides whether to implement the cooperative or defective 
strategy. In the first case, the cooperative amount harvested will be given by the 
maximization at time t of (17), under the usual constraints, for the periods of the 
residual periods of interaction [t , T]. Otherwise, the defection strategy consists of the 
adoption of the dominant Nash strategy that implies harvesting ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚until the end of the 
interactions. 
 
Each agent assigns a given probability, 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑓𝑓), that other agents are free-riders; 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑓𝑓) is 
based only upon the agent’s personal belief, such the same probability to be a free-rider 
is assigned to each other agent, so: 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑓𝑓) = 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁 − 1,  (29) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 is the number of free-riders present in the group estimated by the agent n. 
The estimation is only subjective and is formulated by the agent in a condition of lack 
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of information, and thus it is not assumed that this estimation is equal for all the 
agents.14 The agent constructs his personal beliefs with an action of mental accounting 
where she infers the probability used in the actual context from his past experiences in 
other contexts (Gigerenzer et al. 1991). The logical induction derived from the 
representative agent’s subjective long-term memory suggests that, because she 
experienced acts of free-riding in similar contexts, she should utilize his past 
experiences in the present context, assuming a strictly positive probability that other 
agents could be free-riders. Hence, we have that: 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑓𝑓) > 0  ∀ 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁.  (30) 
 
The representative agent starts harvesting a cooperative amount, ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡), continuing to 
cooperate as long as she believes that the other agents are also cooperating. The strategy 
instead prescribes the defection when the agent’s belief leads her to estimate that at least 
one agent with free-rider intentions has caused her damage with an amount harvested 
that is greater than the cooperative amountℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡). Hence, the condition of damaging 
harvesting occurs at time s when a member of the group takes an amount greater than 
the cooperative one of the agent n: ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑠𝑠)  with  𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁. (31) 
In the case in which the damage occurs because of free-riding, the agent defects. So, at 
each period t the agent n observes the harvesting order, and at time t+1 she will select 
the defective strategy when she has observed the damage occurs, and there is a given 
probability that among the agents that create the damage there is at least one free-rider. 
 
14 The estimation occurs in a context where each agent is subjected to the complete lack of information 
regarding the real intentions of others; hence, the estimated presence of a free-rider is not related to the 
real presence.  
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This probability, 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1), to determine a defective choice, needs to be a value at least 
big enough for the agent to evaluate it as sufficient to the defect: 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1). 
Therefore, assuming that s is a period within [0,T] in which (31) holds, the agent defects 
after time s when the following takes place: 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1),  (32) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑏𝑏 is the probability condition estimated at time s. Then, the harvesting 
strategy of the agent n will be as follows: 
ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = � ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,  𝑡𝑡 > 𝑠𝑠 if 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) ∧  ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑠𝑠),ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡), otherwise.   (33) 
The result of the first proposition expressed in (22) and the condition (24) determined 
by the heterogeneity in the bias factor imply that there exists a first period in [0,T] in 
which (31) holds such that the agent n is posed in a condition of damage. The 
observations of the amounts harvested enable the agent to circumscribe the N-n agents 
that determine damage. Among these, the agent n evaluates the presence of the free-
riders in order to verify the realization of condition (32). Therefore, defining: 𝛺𝛺 = {1, . . . , 𝑛𝑛, . . . ,𝑁𝑁|1, . . . ,𝑁𝑁 = 𝑓𝑓, 𝑐𝑐} (34) 
as the set of all the possible compositions of the group on N agents where each agent 
can be a free-rider, f, or a cooperant, c. The number of the possible cases can be given 
by the ordered selections of N-n subjects in 𝛺𝛺, with the exclusion of the agent himself, �𝑁𝑁 − 1𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛�. 
The probability that there is a situation, where among the N-n agents there is at least one 
free-rider, is given by the ratio between the favorable cases and the possible ones. The 
favorable cases are those where in the N-n agents of the upper sub-group, the number of 
potential free-riders are between 1 and 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 . The probability of presence of a given 
number of free-rider, q, inside subgroup N-n is defined as: 
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𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹 = 𝑞𝑞) =  𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛!𝑞𝑞! (𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 − 𝑞𝑞)! (𝑁𝑁 − 1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛)!(𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑞𝑞)! (𝑛𝑛 + 𝑞𝑞 − 1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛)!
(𝑁𝑁 − 1)!
(𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛)! (𝑛𝑛 − 1)! , (35) 
where the probability for each agent that f is true, about the event (f,c), is given by the 
subjective estimation of the agent n, 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑓𝑓), as derived by (29). 
Therefore: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) =   �𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹 = 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑞𝑞=1 , (36) 
where F is the number of free-riders.  
The defection choice that is derived from (33), given a period s in [0,T] in which the 
condition (31) is verified a first time, occurs if the probability of the presence of at least 
one free-rider 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) is greater than or equal to 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1). Now, considering the 
value of 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1), it is assumed that for a probability of the presence of at least one 
free-rider between the N-n agent that harvests more, close to the certitude that is 
 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1, each agent n chooses the non-cooperative harvesting; hence, having                     𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) ≤ 1  ∀  𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁, it will be: ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚   when  𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1   ∀  𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 (37) 
Now, consider an order that includes all N agents, where each n agent has the position 
equal to the position that his harvesting ℎ𝑛𝑛 has in the order defined in (28). This gives a 
cardinal order that identifies with n=1 the agent who has harvested less and, therefore, 
increasingly until agent N has harvested more than all the others; hence, 𝐴𝐴 = {1, . . . , 𝑛𝑛, . . . ,𝑁𝑁}.  (38) 
Each agent estimates a probability of the presence of a free-rider among the N-n agents 
that have harvested more than him, 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1), as defined in (36). 
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It thus becomes easy to understand that, for an n that approaches 1 in the order defined 
in (38), remembering that 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 = 𝑞𝑞) = 0  when 𝑛𝑛 <  𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 + 1 −  𝑞𝑞 , we have  𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥
1) ≈ 1. This implies that at least the agent that has the first place, n=1, in the order A at 
time s, will decide to defect starting in period s+1. In this way, a new order A is 
generated at time s+1 in which a new agent takes the first position. 
Keeping in mind (37), at each period t, t > s, after that for the first time the condition in 
(31) is verified, at least one agent chooses a defective harvesting amount that is equal to 
hmax from t+1 until T. In fact, at every time t+1 the defection of an agent that, at time t 
was in the condition 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1), determines a new order where at least 
one agent, that at time t+1 had harvested the cooperative amount hc(t+1), evaluates a 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑡𝑡+1  sufficient for the defection at time t+2. This is because at every period 
there is a new agent n in the first place in the order A such that  𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1; hence 
(32) holds true. Therefore, in the following period a new agent will switch from the 
cooperative strategy to the defective one; so, it is possible to assert the following: 
 
Proposition 2: When agents adopt the strategy defined in (33), with heterogeneity in 
the present-bias factor as defined in (12), and they assign a positive probability of the 
presence of free-riders inside the group as in (30), and it is assumed that for every agent 
a probability of the presence of at least one free-rider between the N-n agents that 
harvest more is close to 1, 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1, then (32) holds, and considering that there 
exists at least one period s in [0,T] such that the condition in (31) is verified, then for 
every period after time s at least one agent inside the group stops to cooperate. 
 
The process just exposed auto-fuels time after time and leads, for a sufficiently large 
periods of interaction, to the disappearance of the cooperative actions within the group 
reaching a non-cooperative equilibrium in which all the agent harvest ℎmax  despite their 
previous intentions of cooperation. This process is trigged by the presence of present-
biased preferences. 
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6. Extensive cases: condition for a cascade of defections 
 
Until now this work has showed that within a context populated by conditional 
cooperators with heterogeneous myopic discount factors, the present-biased preferences 
can lead to the application of a triggered strategy that directs the community to 
excessively increase their harvesting level, even if their motivations were cooperative. 
With the restrictive case, this work has revealed the occurrence of cascading defections, 
assuming blindness and no-awareness of the bias of others and absence of tolerance for 
the presence of free-riders.15 Furthermore it has considered the dominant Nash strategy 
as the only defective strategy implementable. But, conditions that are wider and less 
restrictive will be defined next. Specifically, the conditions regarding the two decisive 
decision-making elements of the defection will be defined: first, the critical level of 
estimated free-riders inside the group, implying that over a given number of supposed 
free-riders that damage the agent, she will not be available to cooperate any further, and 
consequently the defection starts when the estimated probability of the number of free-
riders that exceed the critical level is considered sufficiently high by the agent in order 
to defect – and, second, the definition of the behavioral strategy adopted. 
 
6.1 Condition regarding the critical value to defect 
Only on rare occasions do agents behave under certainty; in the restrictive case the 
implementation of a defection strategy occurred for a probability of the presence of 
free-riders close to certitude, which it is too restrictive to fit well with reality. However, 
 
15 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) accurately expresses this absence of tolerance because it expresses that the presence of just 
one free-rider (or the belief that there is a free-rider also because of an erroneous evaluation) is sufficient 
to trigger the defection. 
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we can easily assume that the agent can choose to stop to cooperate in absence of 
certitude as well, without any change in the conclusion drawn in the cascade of 
defections mentioned earlier. In fact, for having at least one agent that stops to cooperate 
at every period is sufficient to assume that the probability 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1)  must be 
positive:16 
0 < 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 1) ≤ 1       ∀  𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁. (39) 
Furthermore, it could be assumed that the agent can consider an estimated presence of 
only one free-rider inadequate to start a trigger strategy, but she may choose to defect 
for more than one estimated free-rider. In this case, agent n is willing to accept the 
presence of a physiological number of free-riders, qn, inside the group. 
We can also extend the nature of this physiological number of free-riders to include 
those who erroneously behave as free-riders. This implies that the agent accepts the 
presence of a given number of agents within his group of harvesting who behave in a 
manner compatible with free-rider intentions. This extension opens up the opportunity 
of introducing heterogeneity within the model, in particular, making it possible to have 
both pure naïve agents and agents that are conscious of the possibility of an erroneous 
implementation of a free-riding harvested amount. For naïve agents, qn  represents 
merely the acceptable number of free-riders within the group, whereas for the second 
one it represents the acceptable number of individuals that behave like a free-rider, that 
includes even those who erroneously act as free-riders.17 A sufficiently large probability 
that the estimated number of free-riders is greater that qn will induce the agent to defect. 
Hence, Pn(F > qn) is defined as the probability - estimated by the agent n – of presence 
 
16 It is trivial that if the defection occurs for a probability of the presence of a free-rider lower that one, 
the result is the same as obtained when the defection begins just in presence to the certitude. 
17 For the simplicity of narration, for both kinds of agents, qn refers to the physiological number of free-
riders within the group (without specifying the peculiarity of the case of the no-full naïve agents). 
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of more free-riders than the physiological one, among the N-n agents who, with their 
higher harvesting, cause to agent n harm; such that: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) = � 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹 = 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑞𝑞=𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛+1 . (40) 
The conditions necessary for the defective choice are as follows: 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛)𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛)  with  𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 < 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛, (41) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛)𝑏𝑏 is the probability evaluated at time s in [0,T] such that the agent 
stops cooperating when at time s the condition in (31) is verified, and the estimated 
number of agents that harvest a compatible free-rider amount exceeding the 
physiological one for a sufficiently large probability of at least 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛), where: 
0 < 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) ≤ 1       ∀  𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁. (42) 
The only condition over qn is that it must be lower than Fn, that is the conditio sine qua 
non to have a conditional cooperant. In fact, if hypothetically the agent takes the non-
cooperative amount only if the number of evaluated free-riders is greater that Fn , it 
means that she is willing to defect for an evaluated presence of free-riders between the 
N-n agents that cause her damage greater than the number that she has assumed to be 
present in the group of N agents, but this is not a real possibility of defecting. In this 
case the behavior is the behavior of an unconditional cooperant, that a priori and 
independently by other elements, always chooses the cooperative amount. 
 
Now, continuing to refer to the strategy defined in (33), but where the condition for 
harvesting hmax at time t > s is 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛)𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) ∧  ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑠𝑠), in others 
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cases the agent cooperates,18 assuming the condition expressed in (41) and (42), it is 
evident that when we assume 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0, given the cardinal order defined in (38), for n that 
approaches to 1 in the (40), we have: 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛→1 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛������������⃗ (𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) = 1.  (43) 
So also extending the properties of the agent’s behavior to the condition (41) and (42), 
at least one agent in each period is in the condition to defect because given the result 
obtained in proposition 1 that guarantees the existence of a time s in [0,T] such that ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑠𝑠) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑠𝑠), and given that 0 < 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) ≤ 1  ∀  𝑛𝑛 ∈ (1,𝑁𝑁), the result in (43) 
ensures that the condition in (41) is verified. Therefore, it is possible assert: 
 
Lemma 3: If each agent assigns a positive 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛(𝑓𝑓) for every other agent, and for each 
agent the probability of an excessive number of free-riders that implies the defection is 
0 <  𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) ≤  1 with 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 <  𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 , then for every period after time s at least one 
agent inside the group will stop to cooperate. 
 
This leads to a decrease in the cooperative behaviors with the passing of the 
interactions, and this decrease depends not on the real presence of an excessive number 
of free-riders but on the impossibility to distinguish the free-rider attempts from the 
cooperative but present-bias choices. 
 
6.2 Conditions for the harvesting strategy 
Until now, the only strategy set considered was one that prescribes, as a defective 
 
18The set of strategies that leads to cascading defections is wider and does not require the strict adoption 
of the Nash dominant harvesting, as will be shown in the following.  
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choice, the non-cooperative dominant strategy, ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ut, it is possible to 
consider a wider range of defective strategies. It will be shown that when an agent 
adopts a tit-for-tat strategy, it is possible it will result in a cascade of defections, 
especially if the defective choice is different from the non-cooperative dominant ones. 
In fact, it is sufficient to consider the adoption of a strategy that prescribes, that when 
the conditions given by (31) and (41) occur, the agent increases his harvesting of an 
amount arbitrarily greater than those of the precedent period and, that the new amount 
also guarantees a harvesting greater than the cooperative amount. If after the increase, 
the defective conditions no longer hold true, the agent maintains a harvesting amount 
not lower than the previous one, ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 1), provided that this amount is greater than the 
cooperative one for period t, in order to maintain the non-cooperative behavior. 
Otherwise, she will harvest an amount arbitrarily greater than the cooperative one, to 
maintain the decision to stop cooperating after the defection conditions are verified the 
first time; and, the increase in the harvesting occurs each time that the defective 
conditions are verified in order to avoid the permanence of the damaging situation. In 
this case, 
ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = � ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡)ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 1) + 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡) + 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡),ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 1)} 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 > 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 ∨ 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠 + 1 if ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 1) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡)otherwise
with   𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇𝑇], 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛), 𝑠𝑠 ∈  𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 ⊆ [0,𝑇𝑇],  (44) 
where Sn is the set of all the periods s in [0, T] such that the condition (31) and (41) are 
simultaneously verified. Furthermore, the arbitrary increase must be a strictly positive 
amount just sufficient to have ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡) and ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) > ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 1), defined as: 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑡𝑡,ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)� > 0 ∶  ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡) ∧ ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) > ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 1).  (45) 
 
As shown earlier in proposition 1, there exists at least a time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏  in [0, T]  such that ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)  when the agent has cooperative but biased preferences, and 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏  is 
defined as the first period in which, because of the heterogeneity in the bias discount 
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factor, given the implication of (23), ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) with 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑛𝑛; and at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 at least 
one agent is in the position to defect in the next round, as shown in lemma 3, because at 
time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏  at least for the agent in the first position in the order expressed in (38), the 
condition in (41) is verified. Hence it is possible to define: ∃ 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ⊆ [0,𝑇𝑇] ⇔ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 :𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛)𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛)  ∧  ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), (46) 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏  is the order as in (38) defined at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏. 
Lemma 3 has already revealed that (46) holds true at least for one agent at each period 
after time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏  when 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝑓𝑓) > 0, 0 < 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑(𝐹𝐹 >  𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 ) ≤ 1 and 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛 <  𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 . In fact, assuming 
the strategy set (44), that includes not only the dominant Nash strategies, but all the 
amounts that respond to a defective intention of the agent, for all the agents within the 
group of N, and defining an order as in (38), we have that for every order At for t in 
[𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏,𝑇𝑇], given (42) and (30), at least for the agent in the first position of the order, the 
probability of the presence of an excessive number of free-riders approaches certitude. 
Hence, we obtain that: ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏,𝑇𝑇] ∃ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 |  for 𝑛𝑛 → 1  𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) = 1. (47) 
It is, therefore, possible to assert the following: 
 
Proposition 3: In every period  𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏,𝑇𝑇], at least one agent is under the condition to 
increase the harvesting amount in the next period t+1, adopting a non-cooperative 
behavior, that referring to the strategies set defined in (44) implies that: ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏,𝑇𝑇] ∃ 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 ∶  𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠 , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛.  
Consequently, if at time t, with 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏,𝑇𝑇],∃ 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 ∶  ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) = ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡), then ∃ 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 ∶  ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 + 1) > ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) ∧   ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 + 1) > ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 (𝑡𝑡 + 1).  
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It is thus very clear that during each period some agent increases his harvesting, moving 
away from the cooperative behavior. This implies a tendency over time to change the 
order of the agents derived from their harvesting level, with a translation of the already 
defective agents to a higher position in the order. In this way, the ones who are still 
cooperative take their place on the lower-side positions observing, time-by-time, the 
increase in the probability that implies defective choices. This phenomenon determines 
the increase in the agents that defect by their cooperative behavior over time. 
In fact, assuming the condition revealed in the model, it is given a context that for his 
peculiarities has always at least one agent in the stage of increasing his harvesting over 
the cooperative level. Therefore, with the passage of interactions, the cooperative agents 
decrease inducing other agents to defect. Agents defect due to their own lower 
harvesting and the increase in the value of the probability as expressed in (40) until the 
level in which the condition expressed in (41) is verified. The consequence of the 
dynamics exposed is a general progressive increasing of amounts harvested, and a 
progressive decay of the cooperative behaviors within the group.  
 
7. Conclusion and final remarks 
 
This work has shown that when the agents are conditional cooperators, the present-bias, 
in the absence of appropriate information or institutions that facilitate the coordination, 
can trigger a cascade of defections from the cooperative strategy like those observed in 
the controlled experiments. Moreover, it shows the conditions and dynamics under 
which the number of individuals that choose to stop to cooperate grows over time.  
It is revealed that, if agents estimate the presence of free-riders within the group of 
harvesters using their long-term memory, without information regarding the real number 
of free-riders, the adoption of defective strategies is generated by the misunderstanding 
regarding the real intention of the present biased agents and by the restricted self-
knowledge regarding their own present biased preferences. 
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Thus, when agents behave conformably to their biased preferences, without any 
instrument of coordination that sustain their existing desire of cooperation, they direct a 
suboptimal allocation of the amount harvested, damaging themselves and the others. 
Therefore, the existence of a cascade of defections, which is also seen in presence of the 
cooperative and prosocial preferences, can be explicated by the dynamics triggered by 
present-biased behaviors when the harvesters cannot distinguish biased choices from 
free-rider attempts. In this case the decline in cooperation in the management of 
commons could be mitigated by adopting instruments designed to oppose the effect of 
present-biased preferences Therefore, the drop in cooperative behaviors can also be an 
effect of the absence of institutional instruments to improve the coordination in the face 
of the cognitive bias that affects human behaviors. 
 
The model presented responds to the idea that a true representation of human behavior 
in the social intertemporal dilemma requires the inclusion of the complexity in the 
decision-making process, in particular, of the cognitive factors that affect the choices. 
These because it is not possible to ignore the social dimension of the human nature 
when common resources are involved. In fact, on the one hand, the adoption of 
sustainable and cooperative behavior in relevant social dilemmas depends on the degree 
of consciousness regarding the effect of the agents’ own behaviors on others, showing 
interest and care for the common resources. This propensity finds form in the 
cooperative and other-regarding motives. On the other hand, the choices reflect the 
capability of a correct evaluation of the costs and benefits that are derived from their 
own decisions. The intertemporal decision-making process that directs the choices is 
also the way in which individuals solve social dilemmas. It is within this process that 
the social preferences find realization. It thus becomes clear that the cognitive aspects 
and the behavioral traits of the intertemporal choices, such as present-bias, are 
fundamental elements that offer a representation of social dilemmas. So the analysis of 
present biased preferences in the intertemporal dynamic is essential in order to obtain a 
full understanding of the dynamics of harvesting (and overharvesting) from the 
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commons. This understanding is also necessary to define and create suitable instruments 
that can sustain cooperative preferences. 
 
The results obtained in this work show with clarity that the cognitive factors that affect 
the intertemporal ability of the agents are greatly involved in the abandonment of 
cooperative interaction over time. However, this is a part of the complexity of human 
decisions, where the causes of a given behavior all interact. Present-bias is one piece of 
the puzzle that, together with the free-rider opportunities, explicates the phenomena 
observed. In fact, the rapidity of the cascading defections depends upon several factors. 
In particular, the presence of heterogeneity in the intentions can contribute to a new 
complexity of the dynamic. But the presence of free-riders, together with the 
cooperative present-biased agents, can only be an additional factor in the rapidity of 
abandonment of cooperative behaviors. Of course, decay in the cooperative intentions 
can also occur independently from the present-bias if the real free-riders are present in 
an excessive quantity, per se. Although these elements affect the rapidity and 
complexity of the defective cascade, but it was not the aim of this work to define this 
speed. Instead, the claim was to show that the observable and observed decay of the 
cooperative choices in the common resources dilemmas are not a unique and 
unequivocal signal of an increase in the free-riding intentions, but can also result from 
present biased preferences and myopic behaviors of the cooperative agents.  
 
In conclusion, the present biased preferences can lead to the application of a trigger 
strategy that can direct the community to excessively increase their harvesting level, 
even if their other-regarding motives were cooperative. Therefore, a decrease in the 
cooperative intentions can also be the effect of the absence of coordination instruments 
in the face of the cognitive bias that affects human behaviors. 
These conclusions are relevant and useful for policies whose goal it is to support the 
cooperative and sustainable behaviors in the management of the common resources. In 
fact, sustaining the diffusion of the prosocial preferences, if it is an essential prerequisite 
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for the adoption of the cooperation in the commons, cannot offer the results desired if 
the individuals and the community lack the necessary instruments for the wise 
management of resources in the face of the risk connected to the present-bias.  
In fact, human behavior follows complex dynamic and decision-making processes. The 
cognitive dimension plays a crucial role and present-bias is one of the elements that, 
moving far from pure rational behavior, increases the complexity of the human 
interaction in the commons. For these reasons, further studies should be included on the 
interrelation between these cognitive intertemporal elements and the social dimension of 
the human nature. 
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